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Introduction
I have previously suggested that doctors’ moral duty 
to respect mentally incapacitated patients’ autonomy 
during decision-making can be fulfilled by helping 
them prepare a written living will before they become 
incapacitated.1 Mentally incapacitated patients 
fall into two categories: ‘formerly-competent’ and 
‘never-competent’ and only the former are capable 
of preparing living wills. For those with living wills, 
the ethical standard of informed consent applies 
and in those without, two other ethical standards 
are available: the substituted judgement standard 
and the best interests standard. Both standards 
are potentially applicable to ‘formerly-competent’ 
patients, but in ‘never-competent’ patients, medical 
decisions can only be guided by the best interests 
standard, one that should be narrowly and medically 
defined. In this paper, I will evaluate the best interests 
standard as it is used in Part IVC of the Hong Kong 
Mental Health Ordinance (MHO) and also discuss 
the substituted judgement standard and the Mental 
Capacity Act (2005) for England and Wales (MCA).
Substituted judgement standard
In some countries, eg the US, a mentally incapacitated 
patient’s next of kin may use the substituted 
judgement standard to make a decision the patient 
would make, based on his/her known prior wishes 
and preferences. As in a living will, the moral principle 
underpinning this approach is respect for patient 
autonomy. Nonetheless, the substituted judgement 
standard is less efficient than a living will because 
the patient’s prior wishes and preferences are only 
known indirectly through surrogate decision-
makers who have to produce clear and convincing 
evidence that the information is true. The recent 
US case regarding the withdrawal of life-sustaining 
treatments from Terri Schiavo, where different courts 
took almost a decade to decide which substituted 
judgements were the more reliable, illustrates how 
complicated and time-consuming this can become. 
In the UK and Hong Kong, substituted judgement 
has never been accepted as a legal standard partly 
because it is considered difficult to use and partly 
because the next of kin or close relatives—the 
people who are most likely to know a patient’s prior 
wishes and preferences—are not legally empowered 
to make surrogate decisions. Hence, in those who are 
‘formerly-competent’ but lack a living will, the best 
interests standard is the only practical one available 
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to surrogate decision-makers.
The ‘medical best interests standard’ and 
‘expanded best interests standard’
The MHO empowers judges, legal guardians, or 
doctors to make medical decisions or provide urgent 
and necessary treatments for mentally incapacitated 
patients, provided that the patient’s best interests 
are being served (Sect. 59ZB, 59ZF). According to 
Sect. 59ZA, ‘in the best interests’ “means … to (a) 
save the life of the [patient]; (b) prevent damage 
or deterioration to the physical or mental health 
and well-being of that person; or (c) bring about an 
improvement in the physical or mental health and 
well-being of that person.” When doctors provide 
urgent and necessary medical treatments for 
mentally incapacitated patients, eg in the Accident 
and Emergency Department, without any instructions 
from judges or guardians, they are driven primarily 
by the duty to provide what a reasonable person 
would want in similar circumstances: scientifically 
proven treatments for that medical condition. Prior 
preferences and wishes are not usually considered 
since they are mostly unknown, and many doctors 
believe their actions are guided by the best interests 
standard, narrowly considered a ‘medical best 
interests standard’.
 Sect. 59ZA has, apparently, more than a narrow 
‘medical best interests standard’ in mind when it 
defines the best interests standard as improving 
on or preventing damage to the ‘well-being’ of 
the patient. ‘Well-being’ is a value-laden term and 
includes subjective factors such as patients’ wishes, 
values, preferences, beliefs etc. Expansion of this 
standard beyond medical interests is done to increase 
patients’ autonomy since competent patients usually 
include non-medical interests when they consider 
their best interests. This intention is confirmed by 
the strong ‘pro-autonomy’ statement in Sect. 59ZK 
that treatments based on the best interests standard 
should be provided “as if” the patient “had been 
capable of giving such consent” and treatments 
“had been carried out with [their] consent.” Given 
the importance of patient autonomy in western 
bioethics, it is not surprising that the MCA has also 
adopted an ‘expanded best interests standard’ for 
mentally incapacitated patients. Sect 4 (6) of the MCA 
stresses that a “best interests” judgement should 
consider “(a) the person’s past and present wishes 
and feelings…; (b) His or her beliefs and values where 
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they would have an impact on the decision.” Hence, 
both the MHO and MCA have extended patients’ 
autonomy using an ‘expanded best interests standard’ 
that includes personal preferences and values—
considerations that are manifestly more explicit in 
living wills or substituted judgement standards.
‘expanded best interests standard’ shortcomings
There are several problems with the ‘expanded best 
interests standard’. Firstly, its application is limited 
to ‘formerly-competent’ patients who have provided 
readily accessible evidence of their prior wishes and 
preferences. It cannot be used for ‘never-competent’ 
patients who never had morally significant interests 
or preferences, and whose treatment can only be 
guided by circumscribed ‘medical best interests’ 
standards.
 Secondly, since doctors are only permitted to 
provide urgent and necessary medical treatments 
for mentally incapacitated patients, it is neither 
sensible nor practical to expect doctors working 
under pressure to use an ‘expanded best interests 
standard’ necessitating extensive information about 
the ‘formerly-competent’ patient. Doctors are often 
forced to forgo respecting autonomy in favour of 
providing beneficial care. The Hong Kong MHO 
appears to have anticipated this problem and put in 
Sect. 59ZS the proviso: “… under this Ordinance, the 
guardian shall ensure … that the views and wishes of 
the MIP [mentally incapacitated patient] are, in so far 
as they may be ascertained, respected.” (Italics added) 
Just as the ethically more desirable substituted 
judgement standard is too complex to be of use, the 
laudable ‘expanded best interests standard’ is often 
displaced by the practical ‘medical best interests 
standard’ because patients’ views and wishes are not 
readily ascertainable. But it seems hypocritical to give 
the morally lofty ‘expanded best interests standard’ 
statutory status and simultaneously provide an 
‘escape clause’ so that the standard need not be met.
 Thirdly, different surrogate decision-makers 
have different interpretations of the patient’s best 
interests partly because best interests permits wide-
ranging discretion2 and partly because the patient’s 
personal information is not equally accessible to 
all decision-makers due to unequal availability of 
time, unequal proximity to the patient etc. This gives 
rise to conflicts between them. Even the law courts 
have not reached a consensus on the definition of 
the best interests standard: “Neither the precise nor 
the general nature of best interests is defined by 
the United Kingdom courts.”3 If the ‘expanded best 
interests standard’ can give rise to more than one 
standard, then it ceases to perform its function as 
a standard. For this and other reasons, the Scottish 
Parliament and its Law Commission rejected the best 
interests standard as a guiding principle.2
 Lastly, the ‘expanded best interests standard’ 
is conceptually muddled as it conflates the best 
interests standard with the substituted judgement 
standard. The drive to include items that usually 
fall under the substituted judgement standard in 
the best interests standard arises from abuse of the 
best interests standard as a moral standard. In Hong 
Kong and England, treatment guided by the best 
interests standard often amounts to nothing more 
than providing non-negligent medical treatment,4 
and there is a strong demand to create a statutory 
‘expanded best interests standard’ that “would no 
longer conflate best interests with non-negligent 
care.”5 Yet, whenever surrogate decision-makers 
consider patients’ prior wishes, values, beliefs etc, 
both substituted judgement standards and best 
interests standards are being used. Surrogate decision-
makers are trying to determine what the patients 
would decide if they were competent, and include it. 
This inevitably conflates the best interests standard 
with the substituted judgement standard, creating 
considerable confusion with interpretation and 
implementation. Consider Sect. 59ZK: “treatment…
in respect of a [patient]…has effect for all purposes 
as if (a) that person had been capable of giving such 
consent…and (b) that treatment…had been carried 
out with the consent of that person.” (Italics added) 
The ‘as if ’ language used is more reminiscent of 
the substituted judgement than the best interests 
standard. The English Law Commission and the House 
of Lords insisted that the ‘expanded best interests 
standard’ is not a substituted judgement because it 
is not trying to determine what the person would 
have wanted, and called it an ‘objective test’ that 
considers all relevant factors in order to determine 
“the person’s actual best interests”. But scholars 
have disagreed: “English courts … have consistently 
rejected … [the substituted judgement standard] 
in favour of a best interest test, but like it or not, an 
element of substituted judgement pervades many 
of the relevant cases”,6 and “Substituted judgement 
becomes an integral part of best interests where such 
judgement can be discerned.”5
Conclusion
It is important to make a clear distinction between 
the substituted judgement standard and the best 
interests standard and not conflate the two because 
they operate at different levels of the moral hierarchy, 
according to the degree to which they faithfully adhere 
to patient autonomy. The living will is the most faithful, 
followed by the substituted judgement standard, 
then the best interests standard. The substituted 
judgement standard is closer to an ‘autonomy-
based standard’, and is ethically preferable to the 
best interests standard, which is more paternalistic.6 
Consider Sect 59S(3) of the Hong Kong MHO which 
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states that “…under this Ordinance, the guardian 
shall ensure (a) that the interests of the…[patient]…
are promoted, including overriding the views and 
wishes of that person where… such action is in the 
best interests of that person; (b) despite paragraph 
(a), that the views and wishes of the MIP [patient] are, 
in so far as they may be ascertained, respected.” This 
section is difficult to interpret and implement since 
it asks decision-makers to both respect and override 
the views and wishes of the patient. Clause (a) can be 
interpreted to endorse a paternalistic best interests 
standard by recommending “overriding the views and 
wishes of that person” if such action promotes the 
patient’s best interests; yet clause (b) approximates 
a substituted judgement standard by insisting on 
respecting the patient’s prior views and wishes. If this 
interpretation is correct, the MHO incorporates both 
standards as an ‘expanded best interests standard’ 
and gives primacy to the substituted judgement 
standard.
 Doctors treating mentally incapacitated patients 
rarely have time to wrestle with the complexities 
of the ‘expanded best interests standard’. Most use 
the ‘medical best interests standard’, relieving their 
consciences with the ‘escape clause’ in Sect. 59ZS. 
This is unfair to doctors. A clear distinction should be 
made between the ‘medical best interests standard’ 
and ‘expanded best interests standard’. In most clinical 
situations doctors should be expected to use only the 
‘medical best interests standard’, leaving the rest for the 
legal guardians and courts. The ‘expanded best interests 
standard’ is intended for judges but not doctors; it is 
better used in courts rather than wards. If by default it 
is done by the doctors, it cannot be done well.
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